25 Summer 2025 Proceedings voluntarily transmitted via radio. That was the full extent of the forecasting available that day. When the Pelican finally arrived at Frisbie Bank around 10 a.m., the weather to the northeast was already building. An hour later, when the captain decided it was getting too rough to stay, the seas had already increased to six feet. When the captain hit the vessel’s starter, the starboard engine roared to life, but the port engine refused to work. The overloaded Pelican—with only one engine, rough seas, and the wind building to nearly 30 knots—started to head for home at approxi- mately two knots. At 12:30 p.m., the Pelican had yet to round Montauk Point. Heavy rain had started and sea conditions were worsening. By 1:30, the Pelican finally made the turn at Montauk Point, allowing the captain to begin the long port turn that would eventually lead them home to Fishangri-la. Unfortunately, the area known as “The Rip” was in a strong ebb tide. Combined with the increased sea state, a strong northeast gale, heavy rain, an overloaded vessel, and only one engine, the Pelican was essentially stuck in place, not making way and not turning quickly enough to avoid waves slamming broadside on the star- board side. Each time a wave hit on the starboard side, it caused the Pelican to roll to port. Unfortunately, most of the passengers had gathered on the port side to avoid the waves coming over the starboard side, this extra weight on the port side negatively affected the vessel’s center of gravity and caused the rolls to port to become more severe. A succession of increasingly larger waves pounded the starboard side of the Pelican, and at around 2:10, the largest wave struck. The Pelican rolled one last time and never righted itself, capsizing the vessel. Only one passenger was wearing a lifejacket. The Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation blamed the vessel’s captain for the tragedy. “From the facts adduced, it would appear that the owner and operator of the Pelican, if alive and able to defend himself, would be subject to serious charges of gross and criminal negligence.”2 In its report, the board recommended that Congress consider legislation to prevent a disaster like the Pelican from happening again. This recommendation was even- tually acted upon. On May 10, 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed H.R. 7952 – An Act to Require the Inspection and Certification of Certain Vessels Carrying Passengers – into law. The act defined a passenger-car- rying vessel as any vessel that transports more than six passengers for hire, closing the 15 GT loophole once and for all, and required that each vessel undergo inspection. Stability Testing Today, every small passenger vessel is issued a stability letter by the Coast Guard in accordance with 46 C.F.R. 178.210 for T boats and 46 C.F.R. 170.120 for K boats. This letter identifies the vessel, when and where the stability test took place, what type of stability test was conducted and, most importantly, the maximum number of pas- sengers and/or cargo allowed on board. If the vessel has multiple decks, the letter also stipu- lates how many people, if any, are allowed on each deck. This maximum number of passengers is further broken down by the specific configuration of the vessel, and that is based on the length of railings, fixed seating and deck space. For the purposes of passenger count, one passenger is allotted 30 inches of rail space, with some exclusions for congested or unsafe areas, 10 square feet of deck area—with similar exclusions for areas that are not fit for passengers, such as interior passageways or toilet spaces—and 18 inches of width for seating. The length of rail measurement may not be combined with either seat- ing or deck space requirements. The total number of pas- sengers from these calculations is the maximum number of passengers a vessel can legally carry, provided it does not exceed the stability letter’s calculations. So, how does a boat owner get one of these stability letters? The answer is a stability test which is required The board is of the opinion that this incident is a clear and unequivocal example of the lack of adequate legislation for the safety of passengers, many of whom apparently go aboard under the impression that some governmental agency has insured that proper safety standards have been met. —U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation report, 08 October 1951, p. 13
