28 Proceedings Summer 2025 experiment has the greatest degree of accuracy, which is why it is required on certain vessels. In contrast, the results of the simplified stability proof test usually come with a slight reduction in the passenger count to com- pensate for the decreased accuracy. Currently, the Coast Guard determines the average weight of a person to be 185 pounds, but from the 1960s through 2011, the assumed average passenger weight (AAPW) was 160 pounds. For vessels on protected routes—sheltered waters generally free of special haz- ards, such as most rivers, lakes, and harbors—the AAPW could be as low as 140 pounds if the vessel carried a mix of men, women and children. Those weights established in 1960 were out of date, so, in 2011, new regulations implemented the 185-pound rule. Vessels had the choice to conduct a new stability test or reduce their passenger count accordingly, and new stability letters were issued to all vessels. SS Eastland Changing course slightly, an article on vessel stabil- ity would not be complete without taking a moment to remember the SS Eastland. By no means was the Eastland a small passenger vessel, coming in at 1,961 GT, but is most certainly relevant to the world of passenger vessel stability. The Eastland capsized at its dock in Chicago in 1915 and 844 died. Many factors were at play on the day the vessel capsized. Built in 1903, the Eastland did not meet the owners’ desired speed of 22 knots, so a few months after construction it returned to the shipyard for modifications. That is where the stability problems started. The original plans were designed for the vessel to achieve 20 knots, carry a large quantity of fruit, and up to 500 passengers. During the modification, a heavy air conditioning system was installed, machinery systems were moved, and the boilers were upgraded, all to make the vessel faster. After the modifications, the vessel sailed with an incredible 3,000 passengers. In successive years, cabins were added and taken away and wooden flooring was replaced with poured concrete, which added tons of weight. The smokestacks were altered, and various other structural changes were made to the vessel. To top it all, the vessel’s ballast system was inadequate and added to the free-motion effect when the vessel rolled. It is well-known that if structural changes are made to a vessel that affect its weight, it will affect the vessel’s center of gravity and stability. The Eastland showed sev- eral times it wasn’t safe, as it often listed 10 degrees. On one voyage, it listed an astounding 25 degrees before righting. It seemed every time this happened, the pas- senger count was lowered slightly. The vessel was sold, so the original owners may have been aware of the issues. Ironically, the final straw for the Eastland stemmed from new regulations attempting to make passenger vessels safer. In 1912, the RMS Titanic sank, and regulations were implemented in 1915 to increase the number of lifeboats aboard a vessel. The owners of the Eastland complied, adding lifeboats to the top deck—an estimated 15 to 20 tons of weight. In July 1915, more than 2,500 passengers piled on to the 265-foot ship for a chartered trip. The ship had taken on provisions and a full load of coal that day in prepa- ration, all stored in the port side hold. As the passen- gers embarked, the ship began to list. The chief engineer attempted to fix the issue by ballasting. The crew also attempted to shift passengers from one side of the vessel to the other, and even ordered some to go below decks to lower the center of gravity, likely leading to more deaths. However, the vessel continued to list. The captain decided to ignore this issue and cast off the lines, prepar- ing to get underway. A few moments later, the ship listed enough that water poured in through open hatches on the port side. The subsequent down flooding added to the list of the vessel, which capsized shortly thereafter. Criminal and civil trials took place soon after the disaster, holding the vessel owners and crew responsi- ble. However, no one was found guilty, as it could not be proven that the crew had acted negligently. Regulations soon followed, giving the newly created Coast Guard greater responsibility over the inspection and stability of vessels. Today, any vessel that has an aggregate weight change of 2% is required to either have new stability cal- culations performed, or a new stability test completed. Conclusion Although the sinking of the Pelican over 70 years ago and the Eastland more than 100 years ago were both tragic maritime disasters, they led to one positive outcome: the implementation of a series of new regulations. Following the Eastland disaster, new stability regulations and increased Coast Guard oversight were introduced, while the Pelican tragedy led to the closing of the 15 GT loophole, significantly improving the safety and stability of small passenger vessels. These regulations have undoubtedly saved thousands of lives in the years sincewwwwww About the author: Originally from England, CWO4 Jonathan Shipperley has served in the Coast Guard for 28 years, mainly in the prevention field. He has been stationed all over the country and overseas and is the author of several thriller novels featuring the Coast Guard, which can be found every- where books are sold. Endnotes: 1. United States Coast Guard. October 8, 1951. Marine Board of Investigation Report, P 10. Retrieved from www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20 Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/pelican.pdf 2. Ibid
