42 Proceedings Spring 2025 of remotely operated or uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV). UxS Threats UAS Threat The same capabilities of UAS that allow the Coast Guard to more effectively execute its missions also make them excellent for commercial applications such as monitoring agriculture, capturing images for real estate, and infra- structure inspections. As UAS technology has become more widely adopted, costs have decreased and capabili- ties have expanded, making these systems accessible not only for various industries but also for recreational use by consumers. However, the same systems that are used for spraying fertilizers and pesticides on fields can also be used for nefarious purposes such as chemical, biologi- cal, and physical attacks. On July 30, 2021, the M/T Mercer Street, an Israeli- managed, Liberian-flagged oil tanker, was sailing in the Arabian Sea when it was struck by a one-way attack (OWA) UAS, blowing a six-foot hole in the top of the pilothouse and killing the captain and a crewmember. Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, these types of attacks by Iranian-backed, Yemen-based Houthi rebels have increased significantly in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as vessels transit through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The threats, however, are not limited to larger OWA UAS. These aircraft have been instrumental in the con- flict in Ukraine, with commercial drones and first-person view drones being used for reconnaissance, grenade delivery, and command and control (C2). First-person view drones—those controlled by a pilot wearing gog- gles that provide a virtual perspective of what the drone sees—can be used to guide vehicle-mounted weapons to their targets, enabling precise attacks on enemy person- nel and vehicles. Group 1 and 2 UAS under 55 pounds can carry payloads to conduct direct attacks, such as the 2018 drone attack on President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela.4 The threats are not limited to overseas loca- tions. There are examples of UAS causing issues in the United States, including accounts of them being used to conduct surveillance of critical infrastructure, like ports and oil and gas facilities, in the maritime environment. In December 2023, there were numerous reported UAS incursions over Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia. Even seemingly innocuous use of UAS to cap- ture imagery at major sporting events poses a danger of injury to those working and attending the events and increases the risk of collision with manned aircraft over- flights. UUV Threats While the Navy has been at the forefront of countering submarines and other underwater vehicles in deep water, the advent, current availability, and future prolif- eration of UUVs has prompted the size of these under- water vehicles. Thus, they are more capable of operating in the shallow coastal waters and ports the Coast Guard is charged with protecting. There have been several incidents of the Coast Guard intercepting submersible and semisubmersible vessels used in drug smuggling. Similar vessels could be used for conducting surveillance, attacking ships, boats, or ports, disrupting the Marine Transportation System and posing environmental threats. These types of vehicles are difficult to find with traditional surface vessel detec- tion techniques. USV Threats Surface targets, while easier to detect, still pose the same risks to assets and ports as their subsurface counterparts. They are as challenging to stop as noncompliant crewed vessels. Historical examples of surface attack vectors, such as the 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen using a small, fast craft, can now be replicated with ease by using USVs. In another example, a bomb- laden USV that the Navy attributed to Iran was used to attack a Saudi frigate5 in January 2017, and similar attacks remain a real threat to the Coast Guard and the ports it protects. The conflict in Ukraine has led to the development of USVs equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, which are used to patrol the Black Sea. Despite having a small Navy, Ukraine has been able to dominate the maritime domain in the conflict by using UUVs and USVs as force multipliers. Legal Authorities Legal Authorities for Counter-UAS The Protecting Emerging Threats Act of 2018 granted the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) statutory authority to coun- ter credible threats from UAS for the safety or security of people, facilities, and assets. These authorities are codi- fied in Title 6 U.S.C. § 124n and allow DHS to detect, iden- tify, monitor, and track UAS, as well as mitigate credible threats by disrupting control and, if necessary, use rea- sonable force to disable, damage, or destroy them. This legislation grants DHS and DOJ the authority to conduct counter-UAS (c-UAS) operations in support of National Special Security Events (NSSE), Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) events, mass gatherings, and protection of federal law enforcement investigations, emergency response, or security function for specified duration and location. Additionally, the Coast Guard is authorized to conduct c-UAS operations when con- ducting Coast Guard-authorized missions under Title
