43 Fall 2025 Proceedings forge ahead under existing legal frameworks, negotiat- ing bilateral treaties with neighboring Arctic nations as necessary along the way to demarcate the boundaries of the continental shelf.8 In any case, the United States is actively accruing data and technology to support future seabed mining activities on its continental shelf inside and outside of the EEZ. Bolstering those initiatives is Executive Order 14285 released in April 2025 that directed expedited review of seabed mineral exploration licenses and called for strengthening allied and industry partnerships to coun- ter China’s mounting influence over mining of increas- ingly valuable seabed minerals.9 In many cases, there are multiple countries vying for claims to the same subsea natural resources.10 For nations who are signatory, UNCLOS contains a recipe for arbitrating competing and overlapping claims. However, increased Arctic access is likely to further intensify territorial disputes as countries race to seize vast eco- nomic opportunities and contend for greater control of resources in the region, including the enormous reserves of oil and natural gas, and minerals that hold the key to military defense and economic growth. The Arctic Council, established in 1996, plays a critical role in these disputes. The Arctic Council is composed of the eight states with land territory in the Arctic, as well as participant organizations and observers. Through multiple working groups, it aims to create a more unified approach for managing natural resources and sus- tainable development of the Arctic.11 Notably, the Arctic Council specifi- cally excludes security and military objectives in its bid to resolve issues through cooperation, coordination, and interaction. After the start of the Russia- Ukraine conflict, collaboration with Russia in the Arctic Council was paused, which resulted in a number of studies and media outlets ques- tioning the Arctic Council’s future viability.12 However, Arctic Council working groups have re-engaged with Russian colleagues in limited capacities—a key step in transcend- ing global geopolitics to focus on regional cooperation and stability.13 In this sense, the Arctic Council and its members continue to succeed in proliferating a long-view approach to Arctic management. And, while the Arctic Council has inculcated peace and stability in the region, the Arctic is not immune to the geopolitical pres- sures felt in other parts of the globe. Geopolitics of IUU Fishing Competition for sources of protein, as well as “gray zone” activities increase the likelihood of expanded IUU fishing activities in the Arctic. While not as well studied as IUU fishing impacts in other regions, the preservation of fish stock in the Arctic is an increasingly important strategic consideration for many countries, including the United States. The 2024 Alaskan commercial salmon harvest was approximately 450 million pounds—the lowest num- ber of pounds harvested on record.14 While overfishing and warming temperatures are the more conventionally considered contributors to fish stock challenges, the pre- cipitous drop in fish catch implies that more insidious factors may be lurking under the surface. Researchers and policy officials are more often considering poten- tial impacts of IUU fishing and foreign pressures in the region as possible culprits.15 Notably, Russia and China have increased their pres- ence in the region and its adjacent waters.16,17 Russia, with its expansive Arctic ambitions, and China, with its growing interest in the region’s resources, have raised U.S. national security alarms. Reports indicate that fishing vessels may be operating On October 24, 2024, CGC Bertholf transits Glacier Bay, Alaska, as it returns from a patrol that took its crew as far north as the Arctic Circle to patrol the maritime boundary line between the United States and Russia and support U.S. strategic interests in the northern Pacific Ocean. Coast Guard photo by Troy Spence
