44 Proceedings Fall 2025 unlawfully in Alaskan waters, exploiting inherent chal- lenges with enforcement in vast Arctic-adjacent oceans.18 While illegal fishing is challenging enough for fish stock management, unreported or under-reported catch adds salt to the wound by skewing the data that scientists use to set catch limits the following year.19 Multiple studies have uncovered extensive fish catch underreporting by Chinese fishing vessels and trans- shipment vessels in the Pacific Northwest—in some cases reporting less than half of the fish caught.20 Having depleted fish stocks domestically, China looks to oceans around the globe to fuel its rising demand for seafood. A growing number of cases suggest that Chinese ves- sels deliberately switch off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, making it difficult to track their movements.21,22 Satellite tracking data shows that fleets cluster along the edges of maritime boundaries, moving deeper into other countries’ EEZs under the cover of night.23 China’s distant water fishing fleet not only impacts the international seafood market, it flouts international sovereignty under UNCLOS. The disruption caused by China’s industrialized fishing operations extends to international seafood supply chain markets, where ille- gally caught fish drive lower prices that disadvantage local fisherman operating under stricter regulations. Even more sinister than global food supply impacts are potential international secu- rity concerns. While fishing ves- sels are not the first thing that come to mind when considering maritime security concerns, use of distant water fishing fleets as a geopolitical tactic is becoming commonplace. In parts of the world, China has become known for its “shadow fleets” of fishing ves- sels. These fishing fleets operate under the guise of commercial activity while skirting interna- tional law to expand China’s mar- itime influence and economic vitality.24 Actively blurring the lines between economic enterprise and state ambi- tion, China’s distant water fishing fleet does not merely seek fish. Fishing vessels are used to establish a persis- tent maritime presence that challenges regional sover- eignty and pushes the boundaries of international law.25 It’s reasonable to expect that these practices will continue marching towards the unspoiled fishing grounds and shorter shipping routes offered by the Arctic. The ownership and operational control of China’s dis- tant-water fishing fleet is both complex and opaque, but is often heavily subsidized by the government, allowing the fleet to operate in international and foreign waters at minimal cost. Many Chinese-flagged fishing vessels and their crews are members of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), or “maritime militia.” Beijing describes PAFMM as “an armed mass organization composed of civilians retaining their regular jobs.”26,27 While mem- bers of this force can operate as independent civilian fishermen, PAFMM receives special training and fund- ing to support military objectives that aid China in dis- torting the rules of freedom of navigation, buttressing maritime claims, and extending economic and surveil- lance reach across the globe.28 Many experts classify this use of fishing vessels to subvert economic and environ- mental restrictions as a “gray zone” activity between peace and war in the Law of Armed Conflict.29 Global Action Against IUU Fishing IUU fishing is a global issue, and the Arctic is no excep- tion. Single-nation solutions offer little return on invest- ment in terms of long-term benefit. Collaboration with other states with Arctic interests, including Russia, is an important piece to deconflicting Arctic resources. The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA), which both China and Russia signed, is a recent major step in collec tive preservation of Arctic pro tein resources. CAOFA acts much like a tem- porary moratorium on commer- cial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean with a goal of preventing strain on fish stocks prior to fully understanding their health and capacity, as well as their inter- connectedness to other regional and global fisheries.30 CAOFA, and the urgency with which it was signed, is an indicator of anticipated increases in vessel traffic in the Arctic as demonstrated by recent trends already showing a dramatic uptick in activity. The Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group’s 2025 update reported a 37% increase in Arctic maritime traffic from 2013to 2024. Notably, of all Arctic maritime traffic observed over this period, 39% were fishing ves- sels.31 This surge will increase the need for continued governance, regulation, enforcement, and international collaboration on other maritime functions like search and rescue and environmental response. In addition to becoming a signatory to CAOFA in recent years, in April 2025, China took a much sought- after step by becoming the 82nd party to the Food and China’s shadow fleet pushes the boundaries of international law.
